Even before the NOVA Woodbridge campus or the Sandy Hook
massacre, the FBI had began devising methods of preventing school shootings
that already occured. I had come across
an issue of the FBI’s Law Enforcement Bulletin that was written in September of
1999 regarding school violence. While I
may not know if these methods are still used today, they seem to be efficient
if they still are. In this post, I will
discuss the preincident preparation methods discussed in this article.
One of the first priorities schools need regarding
preincident preparation would be to have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in
and around the school area. The MOU
would give specific details for not only the local police but also
organizations that respond to such events from when the incident starts to the
end. FBI special agents Stephen Band and
Joseph Harpold mention that MOUs “should state what resources each participant
will provide and identify the command structure” as well as “require ongoing
liaison among all of the participants to enhance communication and maintain
readiness” (“School Violence Lessons Learned”).
This would be useful today because in the event an incident at school can
occur whether it’s a shooting or not, people tend to panic and can make the
situation even more difficult to control.
With a plan already laid out, teachers and personnel will know what to
do calmly and professionally.
If these plans are to operate functionally, there has to be
efficient communication with schools and police agencies. That way, the police will be able to teach
school employees how to react if a situation should occur. MOUs also require the police to have access
to human resources and technical support in order to work efficiently for the
preliminary investigation, which takes a lengthy amount of time. Another important component of MOUs as stated
by agents Band and Harpold is that “the media may arrive at the scene before
the police”, so there is a great importance of “who will issue press releases
and how often that will occur” (“School Violence Lessons Learned”). With the police not wanting false information
given or rumors spreading, it is important that when updates of the situation
are given, they should be given with one hundred percent confirmation. That way, it doesn’t tarnish the reputation
of the police, the school faculty, or someone who was mistakenly identified as
the suspect.
In the case of critical incident responses, Band and Harpold
write that these are necessary so that those who work at the school can
“initiate a formal plan that clearly defines logistical considerations,
communication needs, and victim/witness processing requirements” (“School
Violence Lessons Learned”). Establishing
a command post to discuss logistical considerations allows further decisions to
be made without any leaks to the public.
This allows the police to work without any complications. Communication needs are indispensible not
only to those who are investigating the crime scene, but also so that those who
could offer information about anyone who was in the area can call a phone
number in order to fit the puzzle pieces together. The authors believe that victim/witness
processing requirements are necessary so “victims and witnesses will know where
to go for help” (Band and Harpold). With
these processing requirements, it keeps the preliminary investigation organized
and allows the police to investigate the crime scene while trained workers help
with interviewing witnesses.
To be continued.
Band, Stephen, and Joseph Harpold. “School Violence Lessons Learned.” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin. Sep. 1999:
9-16. Print.
I think we can see the influence of these 1990s processes right in each classroom. There is an emergency flyer near each door that details how students or occupants of those rooms should act in case of weather or active shooter incidents.
ReplyDeleteWhat a great selection of posts you have this week! The research and discussion are impeccable.